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Abstract 
Group formation and in-group bias -- preferential treatment for insiders -- are widely observed social 
phenomena. This paper demonstrates how they arise naturally when people incur a psychological cost 
as the result of defecting when facing cooperators, when this cost is increasing and concave in the 
number of such defections. If some group members are asocial, i.e., insusceptible to that cost, then, 
under incomplete information, free-riding and cooperation can coexist within groups. Signaling of 
one's type can enable groups to screen out free-riders, but signaling is costly, and its availability may 
decrease the welfare of all the individuals in society. 
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a unied theory that explains a number of widely observed
social phenomena: (i) people tend to form groups; (ii) group size is limited;
(iii) groups tend to show in-group bias; and (iv) free-riders and cooperators can
coexist within groups.1 Many previous theories in the literature have o¤ered
an explanation for one or two of these stylized facts, but have rarely aimed to
explain all of them together, mainly because these facts are hard to reconcile.2
In order to explain the above observations together, I suggest a theory that
builds upon one basic assumption about the existence and the shape of a
psychological cost of cheating at the individual level. The term cheatingrefers
here to its common usage in models of the Prisoners Dilemma game, where
it indicates defecting while playing against a cooperative opponent. That is,
a person is endowed with a psychological cost of cheating if this person incurs
disutility from not reciprocating anothers kind actions. The assumption about
the shape of this cost is that it rises concavely with the number of cheated in-
dividuals, so that cheating has a diminishing marginal cost. This feature of
the cost represents scope neglect and resonates with recent experimental work
1For evidence in support of (i) see e.g. Ahn et al (2008,2009), Charness and Yang (2010),
Aimone et al. (2013) and Biele et al. (2008). The relation between group size and cooperation
(ii) is explored for example in Marwell and Schmitt (1972), Komorita et al. (1992), Isaac
et al. (1994), Ledyard (1995) and Holt and Laury (2008). In-group bias (iii) has been
demonstrated both in natural environments: Goette et al. (2006), Bernhard et al (2006),
Fong and Luttmer (2009) and Shayo and Zussman (2011), and in the lab: Tajfel (1970),
Tajfel et al. (1971), Chen and Li (2009), E¤erson et al (2008) and de Cremer et al. (2008).
For evidence in support of (iv) see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Marwell and Ames
(1981), Kim and Walker (1984) and Isaac et al. (1984,1985).
2For example, theories that can explain within-group cooperation often fail to explain
the limit on group size (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Rabin 1993 and Ledyard 1993); others
explain the limit on group size but do not account for group formation and for in-group
bias (e.g., Olsen 1965, Bendor and Mookherjee 1987, Boyd and Richerson 1988 and Suzuki
and Akiyama 2005; see also Dunbar 1993 for an anthropological account); those explaining
in-group bias do not account for group formation, group size, or both (e.g., Becker 1957,
Phelps 1972, Arrow 1973, Choi and Bowles 2007 and Fu et al. 2012); theories that may seem
to explain stylized facts (i)-(iii), most notably theories of reciprocity or reputation (e.g.,
Axelrod and Hamilton 1981 and Nowak and Sigmund 2005 respectively), nd it hard to
explain a coexistence of free-riding and cooperation. Finally, a coexistence of free-riding and
cooperation in equilibrium is explained by, e.g., Palfrey and Rosental (1988) and Bramoullé
and Kranton (2007), but in these papers groups are exogenously given.
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on cheating.3 I show that when people endowed with this psychological cost
interact, cooperation is bound to be limited and this stimulates the formation
of groups that display in-group favoritism. This in-group bias is not built on
any joint agreement between group members to boycottout-group members.
Rather, it is a pure equilibrium phenomenon based on individual decision mak-
ing.
To better understand the idea, consider the following mind experiment.
Imagine you are a collector of cards who has a pack of cards you wish to
exchange in return for other cards you do not possess. On the Internet you
may nd potential trading partners. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that
you can exchange only one card with each partner and that there are no card
duplicates. Once you nd a partner who also wishes to trade cards with you,
the exchange is performed in the following way: your partner puts the card
you have asked for in an envelope and mails it to your home address, while
simultaneously you mail him the card you promised to give in exchange. At
the same time, you make similar arrangements with other card collectors, each
of whom wishes to exchange one card with you.
Now, what if you do not mail some of the cards you promised? With no
duplicates, you attach some (possibly small) value to every single card you
are willing to exchange. So any unsent card gives you more or less the same
benet, the benet of being able to keep that specic card in your collection,
regardless of your decision about other cards. However, the disutility you incur
by cheating an anonymous partner on the web may depend rather crucially
on the total number of partners you cheat. In particular, the assumption
of concavity essentially implies that while the total disutility from cheating
3Scope neglect, or scope insensitivity, represents the notion that people tend to be insen-
sitive to the magnitude of outcomes and particularly to the number of victims (or survivors)
of a certain intervention. This tendency is widely documented (Kahneman, 1986; Desvous-
ges et al., 1993; McFadden and Leonard, 1993; Nordgren and McDonnell 2010; Västfjäll et
al. 2014). For example, by manipulating the expected number of victims of a hypothetical
scenario of chemical leakage, Västfjäll et al. (2014) showed that subjects were sensitive to
risking the life of one chemical engineer (compared to zero), while being insensitive to the
di¤erence between risking either one, two or three chemical engineers. Recent experimental
ndings (e.g., Gino et al. 2010 and Gneezy et al. 2013) are also consistent with a concave
cost of cheating, as subjects tend to choose a corner solution of either not cheating at all or
cheating to the maximum extent.
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increases as the number of cheated partners grows, the marginal and the average
disutility decrease. So while it may be unattractive to cheat one partner in order
to keep one card, it may well be attractive to cheat many partners in order to
keep many cards. In fact, cheating is bound to take place once there are so
many partners that the average disutility from cheating a partner falls below
the value of keeping a card. But the other side of the coin is that cheating
can be prevented if the trade in cards is limited to a su¢ ciently small group of
collectors.
The argument of the basic model (Section 2) thus goes as follows. The
concavity of the psychological cost of cheating jeopardizes any attempt at large
scale cooperation. However, cooperation on a smaller scale is sustainable, thus
triggering the formation of groups. Belonging to a group of limited size ensures
that the temptation to cheat is resistible, and that others can be trusted to
cooperate because their temptation is resistible too.4 Moreover, each member
of the group is bound to show in-group bias an inclination to cooperate only
with members of his own group. Otherwise, a person would have too many
cooperative partners, and the temptation to defect would destroy cooperation
both within and between groups. This argument is developed in a model in
which individuals interact in a standard pairwise Prisoners Dilemma game
resembling the card-trade example. Each individual decides whether or not to
cooperate with any other individual in society. This allows for discriminatory
behavior. I show how groups of cooperators can endogenously emerge in such
a setting and I characterize the feasible size of such groups.
Naturally, not necessarily everyone in society is endowed with a psycholog-
ical cost of cheating, and the existence of this endowment is generally ones
private information (Section 3). To account for this, I model society as con-
sisting of two types  social types, who are subject to the psychological cost
of cheating, and asocial types, who are not subject to this cost. Ones type
4It is interesting to note that in a series of Public Goods Game experiments, Isaac et al.
(1994) nd that in fact cooperation sometimes increases with group size. This may seem
to contradict my hypothesis. However, this nding holds only in the (arguably unrealistic)
case in which the monetary gain of the cheater is independent of his group size. Thus, the
nding is in fact in line with the model of this paper: when monetary gains from cheating
are independent of the number of cheated individuals, people are indeed predicted to cheat
less the larger the group is, as cheating more people implies a higher psychological cost.
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is ones private information, but individuals know the relative proportions of
types in society. Social types do not mind cheating asocial types, but, fear-
ing they might mistake a fellow social type for an asocial type, may end up
being cheated by the latter. This happens in mixed groups, where a minority
of asocial types free ride at the expense of the social types. In these groups,
cooperation and free-riding coexist. Mixed groups will tend to be smaller than
the cooperative groups of purely social types that can form when information
is complete. Moreover, a lower proportion of social individuals in society will
be correlated with smaller social structures. If one considers the level of trust
in society to be a good proxy for the proportion of social types in it, this cor-
relation is in line with evidence in Porta et al. (1996) and Fukuyama (1995),
which indicates a positive correlation between the level of trust in society and
the size of rms and other organizations in that society.5
Real groups are often capable of screening out free-riders by introducing
costly signaling, i.e., demanding that members exhibit some form of payo¤-
irrelevant self-sacrice (Section 4). If the cost of signaling is su¢ ciently low for
cooperative group members to bear and at the same time su¢ ciently high to
distance potential free-riders, signaling groups, consisting only of social types
who fully cooperate with one another, can coexist alongside the mixed groups.
However, the existence of signaling groups strictly decreases the expected utility
of all members of mixed groups, regardless of their type. The reason for this is
that the availability of the signaling technology allows social types to separate
themselves (at a personal cost) from the rest of society, thus depriving the rest
from the benet of interacting with them. Moreover, if the proportion of asocial
types in society is not too high, the possibility of signaling decreases the welfare
of the members of the signaling groups too. Thus, beyond the private cost to
the individual who signals, signaling as a phenomenon imposes a public cost
on society. This negative externality of costly signaling is a signicant point
5Although I do not pertain to establish causality in the empirical sense, my model implies
that social structures reect the individual traits of society members. Note that a reversed
causality, according to which people who happen to live in small groups tend as a result to be
asocial (mainly toward outsiders, maybe due to lack of experience in dealing with strangers),
can account only for asociality between groups but cannot explain free-riding within groups.
Moreover, it takes the social structure as exogenous, while in this paper it is endogenous.
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that has received little attention in the literature on in-group bias and social
identity so far and should be accounted for when considering the problem of
free-riding.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 respectively present the model under complete informa-
tion, incomplete information and with signaling and Section 5 concludes. In
the appendix I suggest theoretical microfoundations for the psychological cost
of cheating and demonstrate how the cost of signaling can be endogenized in
the model.
2 The basic model
Society contains a mass 1 of individuals who simultaneously interact with each
other to play one-shot Prisoners Dilemma (PD) games. The payo¤matrix for
the game is as follows.6
C D
C 1; 1  `; 1 + g
D 1 + g; ` 0; 0
The payo¤ from mutual cooperation is normalized to 1 so that cooperating
with a mass k of individuals yields a payo¤ k. g stands for the gain from
unilateral defection, and ` for the loss from being the victim of the opponents
unilateral defection. I assume strategic complementarity (i.e., ` > g), which
implies that if ones opponent is more prone to defect, one is more prone to
defect too. This assumption is standard in the literature (see e.g. Tabellini
2008 and Levy and Razin 2014). My analysis considers only pure strategies in
every pairwise interaction, but individuals can mixby discriminating between
opponents, i.e., by playing C against some while playing D against others.7
6I adopt here the notations of Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). The zero payo¤ for
mutual defection implies that there is no di¤erence between mutual defection and no interac-
tion at all. Furthermore, it implies that the payo¤ for mutual cooperation is strictly positive,
hence the total return to cooperation increases as the number of ones cooperative partners
increases (nevertheless, groups will be of limited size in equilibrium).
7Mixing in the pairwise interaction level imposes here a modeling ambiguity. As part
of the payo¤ function (the psychological cost) is related to disutility from defecting when
playing against a cooperative opponent, it is unclear how to model the disutility of defecting
against an opponent who uses a mixed strategy is it the realization that counts, or maybe
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2.1 The individuals psychological cost
Beyond the material payo¤s of the game, some people are subject to a psycho-
logical cost of cheating, where cheating means playing D against an opponent
who plays C. Let t(k) denote the cost of cheating a mass k of individuals. This
psychological cost can be thought of as representing the arousal of uncomfort-
able feelings such as shame or guilt on the side of the defector.8 t(0) is set to
0 and t(k) is assumed to (weakly) increase in k the more people are cheated
by the individual, the more it costs him and to be (weakly) concave. I do
not require smooth concavity or even continuity, so any cost function with a
discrete jump at 0 and a weakly increasing and weakly concave continuation
afterwards satises my condition of concavity. In particular, this includes a
step function with a xed cost of cheating for any k > 0, which can capture
a binary distinction between ones self image as a cheater and ones self im-
age as someone who does not cheat. Finally, I add two requirements that are
close in spirit to the INADA conditions: an innite slope at 0 (or otherwise a
discrete jump) and an upper bound on the cost as k goes to 1 (= the mass
of individuals in the whole society). The rst requirement ensures that the
psychological cost is su¢ ciently large to allow for at least some cooperation.
The second requirement ensures that society is su¢ ciently large to allow for a
signicant decrease in the marginal cost of cheating as one becomes engaged
in su¢ ciently many interactions.9 Formally, the assumptions on t(k) beyond
the opponents (impure) intention to cooperate? I prefer to leave these potential controversies
aside.
8Miettinen and Suetens (2008) indeed show that (most) people feel guilty when defecting
in the PD game, but only if their partner has not also defected. The assumption that
defection is costly only when others cooperate is also in line with Fischbacher et al. (2001)
and Frey and Meier (2004), who show that people are generally conditional cooperators, and
with Lopez-Perez (2008), with the exception that Lopez-Perez would treat the k cooperators
as those who respect the norm and the defector as the norm breaker.
9This second requirement can be replaced by the original INADA requirement,
lim
k!1
t0(k) = 0, if the size of society is modeled as unbounded. As for the rst require-
ment, it is more restrictive than is needed for the results of the basic model to hold. Here,
it is enough to have lim
k!0
t0(k) > g. The requirement of an innite slope at 0 is needed
for Proposition 2 (which concerns cooperation under incomplete information). I discuss the
e¤ect of relaxing this requirement after presenting that proposition.
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positive monotonicity and concavity are:
t(0) = 0; t(1) < g, and lim
k!0
t0(k) =1
(or, if lim
k!0
t0(k) is not dened, lim
k!0+
t(k) > 0).
In the appendix I suggest theoretical microfoundations to the psychological
cost of cheating, showing that it can be elicited by generally allowing for psy-
chological costs in the PD game, while requiring that these costs are rational
and e¢ cient in a particular well-dened sense.
2.2 The society
Society is composed of two types of individuals social types and asocial types.
Asocial types are a¤ected only by the material payo¤s of the game, and so for
them defection is a dominant strategy. Unlike them, social types are prone
to the psychological cost of cheating. In the basic model with complete infor-
mation analyzed in this section, the type of each individual is assumed to be
common knowledge. The strategy of each player species the actions he plays
in the PD interaction with any other player in society. Society is in (Nash)
equilibrium if, given the strategies of all other individuals, no individual has a
protable deviation from his strategy.
2.3 Solving the model
The result that cooperation can be sustained within groups of social types, but
in-group bias, i.e., defection when playing against out-group members, is bound
to emerge too, is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let K 2 (0; 1) be the unique strictly positive solution to the
equation t(K) = Kg. Then in equilibrium:
1. Every asocial type plays D against everyone else, and everyone else plays
D against him.
2. Every social type plays C against a mass of individuals of size K or less,
who play C against him too, and plays D against everyone else.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is easy to understand when considering deviations from full
cooperation. The concavity of the psychological cost (in the number of cooper-
ative partners) and the linearity of the material gain from unilateral defection
imply the existence of a certain threshold on the number of cooperative part-
ners, beyond which a social type is better o¤ by cheating (all of them).10 This
threshold is K (see Figure 1). As cheating cannot be sustained in equilibrium
the cheated side always has a protable deviation to playing D pairwise
interactions in equilibrium are only of two kinds: either C-C or D-D. This
implies that all relationships will be mutual. Finally, since asocial types are
observable and will always choose to defect, their interactions in equilibrium
are only of the D-D kind.
As my main focus in this paper is on the formation of mutually exclusive
groups, I present now the following denition and a relevant corollary of the
proposition:
Denition 1 Let a cohesive group be a collection of individuals who play C
with each other and play D against all out-group members.
Corollary 1 Any partition of the social types into cohesive groups whose sizes
are bounded by K can be sustained in equilibrium.
The result implies that it is easier to sustain cooperation in smaller groups.
This sounds plausible when considering the limited size of tribes and clans,
especially in societies with no central authority (where groups are presumed
to form spontaneously). The result is driven by the concavity of the cost of
cheating: as the size of the group increases, it becomes harder to avoid the
temptation to defect in order to achieve the ever growing material benets of
unilateral defection. At some point one is bound to surrender to the temptation
and cheat. The limit on group size in equilibrium is the threshold above which
this is bound to occur.
10The material gain from unilateral defection is assumed to be linear for simplicity, but
this is not a necessary condition for this result to hold. If the material gain is concave, the
necessary condition is that the psychological cost will be even more concave.
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Figure 1: The limit on a cooperative group size. For any given mass k of
cooperators, the red line depicts the material gain from cheating them, while
the blue line depicts the psychological cost of doing so. These lines intersect
at k = K. A social type can cooperate in equilibrium with any group of social
types as long as their massK does not exceed K, because deviating to defection
against any subset of this group (of size k  K) will reduce his utility the
blue line is always above the red line at that range. However, maintaining
cooperation in a group of size larger than K is impossible, as, for any member
of the group, a deviation to complete defection will be protable.
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Another aspect of the result is that it generates in-group bias: In equilib-
rium, social types would show the same level of asociality towards out-group
members as asocial types would, while exhibiting sociality only towards in-
group members.11 This suggests that even people who choose a very coop-
erative life style, e.g. Kibbutz members, would restrict their cooperation to
within their group alone. Indeed, in an experiment conducted by Ru­ e and
Sosis (2006), Kibbutz members exhibited the same level of generosity as that of
city residents towards anonymous out-group peers, while showing higher levels
of generosity towards anonymous in-group peers. This pattern of in-group bias
was also documented in early experimental studies of the Prisoners Dilemma
game in a group context.12 More recently, de Dreu (2010) found similar pat-
terns using the Intergroup Prisoners DilemmaMaximizing Di¤erences Game
(IPD-MD). He showed that, compared to individuals with a chronic pro-self
orientation, those with a chronic prosocial orientation (i.e., social types)
displayed stronger in-group trust and in-group love  they were self-sacricing
to benet their ingroup  but not more or less outgroup distrust and outgroup
hate. As I argue in Section 4, the self-sacrice practiced by social types is not
always intended to benet the ingroup, but could instead be a means of costly
signaling.
3 In-group bias under incomplete information
In this section I relax the somewhat strong assumption that asocial types can
be easily distinguished from social types. Instead, here an individuals type
is his private information. Let the mass (and proportion) of asocial types in
society be p and suppose that this is common knowledge. Can there still be an
equilibrium with some cooperation in it? The following proposition, preceded
by a denition, shows that the answer is in the a¢ rmative.
11If K is larger than the mass of social types in society, the social types may be united in
one group, showing in-group bias only towards the asocial types. Moreover, it almost goes
without saying that the degenerate state where every individual plays D against everyone
else is sustainable in equilibrium too.
12For example, Wilson and Kayatani (1968) and Dion (1973) found that the competitive-
ness that characterized inter-group behavior resembled that of individual players, whereas it
was the increased proportion of cooperative choices exhibited in intra-group decisions that
deviated from typical inter-personal play (see also further analysis in Brewer 1979).
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Denition 2 A mixed group is a collection of individuals of both types, such
that:
 All social types in the group play C against all other in-group members,
and D against all out-group members.
 All asocial types in the group play D against both in-group and out-group
members.
Proposition 2 Given p 2 (0; 1), 9Kp 2 (0; K) such that a mixed group of size
K is sustainable in equilibrium if and only if K  Kp. Furthermore, Kp is
strictly decreasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the proposition is similar to that of Proposition 1. From
the point of view of a social type, the trade-o¤ is still between cheating some
cooperative partners (the social types in his group) and the material gain from
doing so. However, here (i) the material temptation to defect is greater strate-
gic complementarity implies that the increase in the expected payo¤ achieved
by avoiding the sucker payo¤ ` is larger than g, the increase achieved by playing
D against a cooperative partner and (ii) the psychological cost of playing D
against a random group member is lower (because some of the victims of
defection will be asocial). See Figure 2 for illustration.
Corollary 2 Any partition of society into mixed groups whose sizes are bounded
by Kp forms a Bayesian equilibrium.
The corollary refers to equilibria in which mutually exclusive groups coexist.
In these equilibria, social types show in-group bias, by playing C against all
group members and D against all outsiders, while asocial types play D against
everyone, thus free riding on the social types in their groups.13 These groups
13Strictly speaking, we can also get Bayesian equilibria in which not all the social types in
a mixed-type group cooperate, accompanied by an appropriate system of beliefs. However,
in such equilibria, all groups must be of exactly the same size, which is the unique size
that would make social types indi¤erent between cooperation and defection. This restriction
makes these equilibria somewhat articial. Moreover, just as in the basic model, here too
I do not characterize all the equilibria that exist under incomplete information. Instead, I
focus throughout the paper on the case where separate groups are formed and analyze their
characteristics.
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Figure 2: The limit on a mixed group size. For any given mass k of opponents,
such that a proportion p of them defect while the others cooperate, the purple
line depicts the material gain from playing D against all of them, while the
dark blue line depicts the psychological cost of doing so. These lines intersect
at k = Kp. The red and light blue lines are taken from Figure 1 and are
displayed for comparison. The purple line is drawn above the red line because
` > g; and so the returns to defection are larger when facing a mixed group.
The dark blue line is drawn below the light blue line because the psychological
cost applies only to defection against cooperative opponents and there are less
of those in a mixed group. It is thus easy to see why Kp < K and why Kp is
decreasing in p.
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are bound to be smaller than the groups of purely social types in the complete
information case (i.e., Kp  K). Moreover, the maximal group size is decreas-
ing in p because the greater the proportion of asocial types in society is, the
more it is tempting for social types to defect, hence the smaller the groups
are that can sustain cooperation.14 The cooperative behavior of social types
and the sustainability of free-riding in equilibrium are in line with the weak
free-riding hypothesis. This hypothesis, stating that some people in the group
will free ride while others will not, was shown to hold in experimental settings
such as the one in Marwell and Ames (1981).
An interesting scenario is revealed when considering the case of p > 1=(1+`).
In this case, the proportion of asocial types in society is su¢ ciently high to
make the expected payo¤ of a social type in a mixed group of size K negative,
regardless of the value of K (because his expected payo¤ is K[(1  p)  p`)] <
0). This means that such a social individual would have been better o¤ in a
society where everyone else is known to defect (so that he could defect too with
no pangs of conscience and get a zero payo¤). However, even in the case of
p > 1=(1 + `), mixed groups of size K  Kp are sustainable in equilibrium,
and social types in these groups end up playing C when interacting with other
group members, in order to avoid hurting other cooperative individuals like
themselves.15
4 Introducing signaling
4.1 Suckers and signalers
In reality, groups often use signaling in order to enhance cooperation and to
screen out free-riders. The signaler would usually exhibit a small sacrice,
14However, groups that are su¢ ciently small can sustain cooperation. This is so because
in such groups the material payo¤s are low, so there is not much to gain by defection, while
the psychological cost of cheating kicks-in already on the rst occasion of cheating. If we
relax the requirement that lim
k!0
t0(k) is innite, we get that for su¢ ciently large values of p
cooperation is unsustainable even in small groups.
15One may think of this situation as resembling the frustrating state of someone who pays
taxes in order not to free ride other people like him, in a country with so many tax evaders
that he would be better o¤ with no tax system and no public service at all.
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which is meant to reveal his true type.16 On rst impression, signaling may
seem incapable of helping the social types in my model they can never ac-
quire the cooperation of asocial types, and the cooperation of social types in
their (mixed) groups is anyway guaranteed. However, if social types condition
their own cooperation on the opponents signaling, an equilibrium with costly
signaling, where the cost is compensated for by achieving group cohesiveness,
may nevertheless exist.17
Suppose therefore that the pairwise PD game is preceded by a signaling
stage, in which every individual decides whether on not to signal. The signal is
not directed at any specic partner, but is rather a particular payo¤-irrelevant
sacrice that is observable by everyone else.18 The cost of signaling is denoted
by xs for social types and xas for asocial types. I will refer to the signal as
a signal of sociality, as everyone, regardless of ones type, would like to be
considered a social type and achieve the cooperation of his partners (i.e., even
if he intends to cheat them). The signal may then be reliable or unreliable.
Denition 3 Signaling (of sociality) is said to be reliable if the signaler is
guaranteed to be of a social type
The condition under which signaling is reliable will be stated later. If signal-
ing is indeed reliable, there is a natural interpretation for the group formation
process that takes place after the signaling stage: Those who did not signal, be
they social or asocial, can form mixed groups as before; those who did signal,
and are therefore guaranteed to be social types, can form signaling groups.
Denition 4 A signaling group is a cohesive group whose members signal and
condition their cooperation with other group members on them signaling too.
16Analyses along these lines can be found in Camerer (1988), Akerlof and Kranton (2000),
Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006).
17Camerer (1988) seems to miss this point when he models gift exchange as a signal of
willingness to invest later in a relationship. He concludes that in cases where willing
(social) types anyway invest (cooperate) when facing an unknown type under incomplete
information, there is no potential for signaling.
18This feature of the signal is quite common in the literature (e.g., Iannaccone 1992, Levy
and Razin 2012). Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to have signaling at the level of the
group or the society as a means to promote pairwise relationships. See Gintis et al. (2001)
for examples of biological signals of this kind and the evidence on Meriam turtle hunters in
Smith et al. (2003).
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As the following proposition states, signaling groups are bound to be of a
medium size.
Proposition 3 A signaling group is sustainable in equilibrium if and only if
its size K is in the range
h
xs; K^  min
n
1  p; K; xas
1+g
oi
:
Proof. See Appendix.
To see why the conditions in the proposition are required, suppose that a
signaling group of size K exists. As cooperation is maintained (only) within
the group, the payo¤ of each member of the group is K   xs. If this payo¤
is negative, one can just stop signaling and get a zero payo¤.19 This sets the
lower bound on group size. The upper bound contains three elements. First,
there should be su¢ ciently many social types in society to form the group
(K  1 p). Second, K has to be bounded from above by K; because otherwise
every group member has a protable deviation to cheating even though he
truthfully signaled that he is social. Finally, the third element ensures that the
payo¤ of an asocial type who signals and then cheats the other group members,
K(1 + g)  xas, is negative. In fact, this condition is essentially the condition
for reliable signaling, as it guarantees that every signaler is social.20
The upper limit on group size implies that if there are many signalers in
society, they cannot simply all cooperate with each other, but must instead
divide into separate signaling groups.21 In this sense, signaling is not a cure
for the limit on cooperation. However, Proposition 3 implies that the size of
19Note that the other group members condition their cooperation on him signaling, so he
does not have to cheat once he stops signaling.
20One can also think of equilibria with signaling that is unreliable according to Denition
3. For example, it is possible to construct a pooling equilibrium in which all individuals
in society (of both types) pay the cost of signaling and are members of mixed groups. If
everyones expected payo¤ is positive and if deviation to not signaling implies being treated
as someone who is for sure asocial and thus receives a zero payo¤, this can constitute an
equilibrium. Another example is an equilibrium where asocial types can impersonate being
social types (because signaling is unreliable) but do not do so because the equilibrium payo¤
for each of them is higher without signaling. This can happen if they are members of
su¢ ciently large mixed groups. Such an equilibrium requires strong assumptions about the
beliefs of social types who do use the unreliable signaling in equilibrium. These possibilities
are left outside the model.
21Of course, if for a given proportion q of signalers in society there exists no such feasible
division, then no equilibrium with proportion q of signalers exists.
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signaling groups is bounded not only from above but also from below, where
the cost of signaling for group members sets the lower bound. It follows that, if
this cost is high, signaling groups should be su¢ ciently large in order to exist.
In reality, groups often determine this cost for themselves. Thus, the heavier
is the cost determined by the group, the larger must the group be in order
to survive. However, if the cost is set too high (above K^, as dened in the
proposition), no individual will take part in such a group. These observations
are in line with evidence reported in Iannaccone (1994). Firstly, Iannaccone
reports that in the US, stricter churches (i.e., those that require a higher cost
in terms of membersdevotion) tend to be larger. Secondly, he writes that the
data imply optimallevels of strictness, beyond which strictness discourages
most people from joining or remaining within the group.22
Abstracting from the issue of feasible group size, the following corollary lists
the conditions on the model parameters that allow for signaling in equilibrium.
Corollary 3 Signaling groups can exist in equilibrium if and only if the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
1. Feasibility: xs  1  p
2. Separability: xas
xs
 1 + g
3. Individual rationality: xs  K
Proof. The corollary follows immediately from a comparison of the lower and
the upper limits on the size of signaling groups in Proposition 3.
Figure 3 illustrates graphically the conditions of the corollary. The rst
condition simply guarantees that there are su¢ ciently many social types for at
22According to Iannaccone (1994), the high cost of adherence to the strict rules of conduct
(which I interpret as the cost of signaling  see also Section 4.2.3) enables the church to
screen out potential free-riders and this in turn raises its attractiveness and thus increases its
size. In my model, the higher cost of signaling used by stricter churches does not necessarily
generates attractiveness, but it implies that they must attract many members in order to
survive, thus the surviving strict churches are bound to be large. Note also that when
analyzing the ability of strict churches to attract followers, it is equally important to analyze
what makes imitation by asocial types even more costly, otherwise separability of the types
cannot be achieved.
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Figure 3: Displaying the conditions that allow signaling groups to exist, as a
function of the cost of signaling for asocial types (xas) and for social types (xs).
The blue diagonal line is where the ratio of these type-dependent costs is equal
to the ratio of the typesrespective payo¤s from interacting with a cooperative
partner, i.e., where xas
xs
= 1 + g. It marks the border between the region where
social types can potentially distinguish themselves from the asocial types by
signaling (below it to the right) and the region where they cannot (above it to
the left). Moreover, if xs, the cost of signaling for the social types, is above
the horizontal green line, signaling is either unfeasible, because there are not
enough social types in society to form even one signaling group; or it is not
individually rational, as the gain from cooperation in a signaling group cannot
exceed K in equilibrium. The region below the green and the blue lines is
where signaling groups of size K 2
h
xs; K^  min
n
K; xas
1+g
; 1  p
oi
may exist
in equilibrium.
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least one signaling group in society. The second condition compares the cost
of signaling for both types. Naturally, in order to achieve separation between
the types, the cost of signaling sociality should be lower for social types than
for asocial types (a reasonable assumption in itself, reecting the notion that
it should cost more to fake sociality than to signal it when it indeed exists, as
argued in Frank 1987). However, as the second condition implies, this is not
su¢ cient, since the gain for an asocial type from being considered as social
exceeds that of a truly social type by a ratio of 1 + g to 1. Therefore, an
asocial type will be willing to pay a higher cost in order to be perceived as
social, and so separation requires a ratio of costs that is larger than 1 + g.23
Finally, the third condition states that the cost of signaling should not exceed
K. This guarantees that cooperation is sustainable, so that one may benet
from belonging to a signaling group.
The conditions in the corollary can be stated as one condition, xs < K^. It is
important to note that this condition does not guarantee that a fully separating
equilibrium will indeed emerge. There is always an equilibrium where everyone
plays D, and there are always pooling equilibria in which no one signals yet
cooperation among social types is maintained within mixed groups. In these
cases, a social type cannot hope to gain from a unilateral deviation to signaling
his type, even if the signal is known to be truthful. Even more interestingly,
there can be semi-separating equilibria in which signaling groups coexist side
by side with mixed groups. A natural interpretation of this kind of equilibria
is that they reect how di¤erent individuals may nd di¤erent solutions to the
problem of cooperation: some may choose to endure free-riders in their group,
while others may choose to engage in wasteful signaling.
4.2 Signaling: a double-edged sword
The multiplicity of equilibria invites a comparison of them in terms of welfare
and stability. As will be shown here, these concepts are tightly related. I
start by analyzing the e¤ect of signaling on the welfare of individuals who
23In Appendix B, I show how the cost of signaling can be endogenized in the model.
There, the cost is determined by the willingness of types to contribute to a public good
at the signaling stage, and the separability condition is stated as a requirement on other
primitives of the model.
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do not signal and on the signalers themselves, and then introduce a stability
concept that reects the welfare result from a di¤erent angle. I keep focusing
on partitions of society into mutually exclusive groups, where each group can
be either a mixed group or a signaling group.
4.2.1 Welfare analysis
In order to compare the welfare of di¤erent partitions of society, I introduce
the following denition.
Denition 5 A coalition formation is a partition of society into mutually ex-
clusive groups, be they mixed groups or signaling groups, such that the individ-
ualsstrategies under this partition form an equilibrium.
The following result highlights the negative externality of signaling on soci-
ety. It essentially states that the existence of signaling groups strictly decreases
the expected utility of all members of mixed groups, regardless of their type.
Proposition 4 For any given p 2 (0; 1) ; the expected payo¤ of all the non-
signalers in any coalition formation that contains a non-zero mass of signalers
can be strictly increased by prohibiting signaling.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. Signaling groups contain
only social types. Hence, when signaling groups exist, the actual proportion of
asocial types in the rest of the population (i.e., outside the signaling groups) is
higher than p. This has two negative e¤ects on the expected payo¤ of members
of mixed groups. The rst is a greater expected number of interactions with
defecting opponents for any given group size (and a smaller number of interac-
tions with cooperative opponents). The second is a decrease in the upper limit
on the size of mixed groups, which implies a reduction in the maximal expected
payo¤ of group members of both types. Hence, if signaling is prohibited, mixed
groups can be larger and more cooperative, allowing for higher payo¤s for both
types.
Thus, beyond the individual cost for the signaler, signaling as a social phe-
nomenon imposes a public cost on society. This public cost represents societys
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loss of good guys, who form their own exclusive clubs, instead of mixing with
the other parts of society and lifting the average willingness to cooperate. One
may think that at least for the signalers themselves signaling improves welfare.
However, the following lemma states that this is the case only for su¢ ciently
large values of p.
Lemma 1 Suppose that xs < K^ and let pc be the unique implicit solution to
the equation
K^   xs = Kp[1  p(1 + `)]: (1)
Then there is a tipping point for a social type in the coalition formations that
maximize his expected payo¤, he is signaling if and only if p  pc.
Proof. See appendix.
Equation (1) compares the maximal expected payo¤ of a social type in a
signaling group (LHS) and in a mixed group (RHS). Since the LHS is constant
while the RHS decreases in p,24 social types can be better-o¤ by signaling if
and only if the proportion of asocial types in society is su¢ ciently high, with
pc being the tipping point. Figure 4 illustrates this result. Together with
Proposition 4, Lemma 1 implies that when p < pc, a coalition formation in
which all groups are mixed and of maximal size (if it exists) Pareto dominates
any coalition formation that includes signaling groups (note that this applies
also to the asocial types, who gain maximally from free riding in this case).25
4.2.2 Stability of equilibria with signaling
The welfare result in Lemma 1 is related to the concept of core stability of
coalition formations, which I adopt from Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and
Banerjee et al. (2001).
Denition 6 A coalition formation  is said to be unstable if there exists an-
other coalition formation 0 and in it a coalition T =2 , such that all members
of T have strictly higher payo¤s under 0 than under .
24The RHS decreases in p because both Kp and [1  p(1 + `)] decrease in p.
25Technically, it may be the case that not everyone can simultaneously be part of a mixed
group of the maximal size (if 1 is not divisible by Kp). Similarly, it can be the case that not
all social types can be part of signaling groups of maximal size (if 1   p is not divisible by
K^). The formal results presented in the paper take this into account.
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Figure 4: The tipping point for social types. f(p)  Kp[1   p(1 + `)] is the
maximum expected payo¤ of a social type in a mixed group. It is achieved
in a pooling equilibrium (i.e., when there is no signaling in society) when the
individuals group is of the maximum possible size given p. K^   xs is the
expected payo¤ in a signaling group of the maximum size. If p, the proportion
of asocial types in society, is smaller than pc, a pooling equilibrium where
all groups are of maximum size Pareto dominates all other equilibria, and so
signaling is wasteful. If pc > p, social types can get a payo¤ of K^   xs in
signaling groups of maximum size, and this payo¤ is strictly greater than the
expected payo¤ they can achieve in mixed groups.
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In our context, T would be a mixed group or a signaling group that does not
exist under the considered coalition formation , yet is feasible in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If p < pc; then any coalition formation with a non-zero mass
of signalers is unstable.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this result is rather straightforward in light of the def-
inition. What makes the coalition formation with signaling unstable is that
members of both signaling groups and mixed groups can increase their payo¤s
by forming larger and more prosocial mixed groups, which cannot exist when
signaling is used.
This result implies that if one restricts attention only to stable equilibria,
then these equilibria can contain signaling only as long as the asocial types
constitute a su¢ ciently large fraction of the population. It is thus very similar
in spirit to the conclusion of Iannaccone (1992) about the conditions under
which costly signaling will be used by social clubs, cults or communes.26
4.2.3 Religious practice as costly signaling of sociality
In order to illustrate the potency of the model with signaling to highlight
group behaviors in the real world, I consider in this subsection an application
to religious groups and religious practices. There is extensive literature on the
positive relationship between participation in religious rituals and intra-group
cohesiveness and cooperation (e.g., Sosis and Ru­ e 2003, Ru­ e and Sosis 2007,
Hayden 1987, Turner 1969, Wilson 2002, Ellison and George 1994). There is
further evidence that, with regard to out-group members, at least some of the
religious groups condemn deviance, shun dissenters, and repudiate the outside
world (Iannaccone 1994), i.e., they show in-group bias. It therefore seems
that on the one hand, religious rituals enable the practitioners to signal their
26In Iannaccones (1992) model, society consists of two types of people, type 1 and type 2,
such that type 1 people participate in group activities and value group quality less than type
2 people. Thus, the equivalents to type 1 and type 2 people in my model are asocial types
and social types respectively. Proposition 2 in Iannaccones paper then states that as long
as people of type 1 constitute a su¢ ciently large fraction of the population, there will exist a
signaling equilibrium in which type 2 people end up in groups that require their members to
sacrice a valued resource or opportunity(the italics are mine).
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social value to the community and to screen-out potential free-riders in order
to achieve cohesiveness, yet on the other hand, the segregation of practitioners
from the other parts of society deprives non-practitioners and members of other
religious communities from the benet of interacting with them.
My model suggests a possible mechanism behind this observation.27 As a
test case, consider Christians who attend Sunday prayers. People who go to
church every Sunday are often considered to be normative people who possess
socially desirable characteristics such as sympathy and concern for others (so-
cial typesin this paper).28 But is it going to church that makes people behave
nicely (maybe because they are inuenced by the reverends sermon), or is there
a di¤erent mechanism at work here? Of course, a religious person who goes to
church may acquire there a belief in reward and punishment, and this in turn
can make him a social type.29 But then, why would such an individual dis-
play in-group bias? Interpreted in the context of my model, attending Sunday
prayers is solely a costly signal: By attending Sunday prayers and enlisting in
the local religious congregation, a person signals his trustworthiness, and gains
the cooperation of other people like him. If social types like him condition their
cooperation on observing this signal, they will conne all their sympathy and
concern to their congregation members, trusting them to be social too because
they attend church also on Sundays.30
However, in-group bias will not be directed only toward non practitioners.
In light of the model, the religious groups are doomed to be su¢ ciently small
to maintain their cohesiveness. This implies that believers would split into
many separate groups that repudiate each other. This observation is indeed in
line with the large variety of religious congregations one can nd: Even in the
27For other models of religious practice as a signal see, e.g., Iannaccone (1992,1994);
Berman (2000); Levy and Razin (2012,2014); and Hugh-Jones and Reinstein (2012).
28This is alluded to in various novels and lms, such as, for example, Truman Capotes
(1966) novel In Cold Bloodand Joseph Hellers (1974) novel Something Happened.
29As in Levy and Razin (2012) for example.
30For this theory to hold, signaling should be a reliable screening device, i.e., attending
church regularly should be too costly for the asocial types. Note also that if religious
practice is only (or mostly) a signal, then one can be a believer and still not go to church
at all. This separation between belief and actual religious practice is well demonstrated
by Huber (2005), who nds a large variability in the degree to which religious beliefs are
associated with decisions to participate in religious services.
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US alone, Christians are divided among Baptists, Anabaptists, Methodists,
Evangelists, Presbyterians, Lutheran, Mormons, and many others churches,
including various independent congregational churches.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that a simple and quite intuitive assumption about our social
conscientiousness, and more specically, about our psychological cost of defect-
ing from cooperation with others who wish to cooperate with us, can explain a
plethora of prevailing group behaviors. These behaviors range from the mere
existence of groups, through in-group bias, to costly signaling of sociality and
the positive correlation between the use of such signaling in a particular group
and the cohesiveness of that group. Moreover, quite intuitively, an inability to
distinguish between social types, who are characterized by such a psychological
cost, and asocial types, who are not, gives rise either to costly signaling or
to sustainable free-riding. The trade-o¤ between the cost of signaling on the
one hand, and the cost of having free-riders in the group on the other hand,
explains why cohesive groups who engage in costly signaling can coexist side
by side with mixed groups, in which no signaling is practiced but free-riding is
likely to happen. If the fraction of asocial types in society is small, the existence
of signaling groups is shown to lead to an equilibrium that is Pareto inferior.
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A Appendix: Theoretical microfoundations to the psy-
chological cost of cheating
This section endogenizes the psychological cost of cheating by suggesting theo-
retical microfoundations that support my assumption that cheating (and only
cheating) is what triggers a psychological cost, and that this cost is plausibly
described by an increasing and concave function. The argument is based on
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showing that a cost of cheating is both rational and e¢ cient.
Consider a PD game and suppose that beyond the material payo¤s of the
game, people are subject to psychological costs that are related to the possible
realizations of the game. These costs can capture feelings such as shame, anger,
pity, envy, pride, frustration, guilt, etc., that are aroused if a certain outcome
of the game is realized. However, a psychological cost is required to be rational
in the following sense.
Denition 7 A psychological cost is said to be rational if it has the potential
to strictly increase the material payo¤ of the individual incurring it.
Claim 1 A psychological cost is rational if and only if it is associated with the
realization [D,C]
Proof. In order to increase the material payo¤ of the individual, the psycho-
logical cost must induce cooperation by his opponent. As the opponent may
cooperate only if he believes that the individual will cooperate too, the psy-
chological cost must facilitate the cooperation of the individual himself, and so
can only be attached to playing D. However, this requirement is insu¢ cient,
as having a psychological cost attached to the realization [D,D] cannot induce
cooperation. To see why, suppose this cost is so high that the individual prefers
[C,D] to [D,D]. Then, the opponents best strategy is to play D and get the
maximal payo¤, 1 + g. Hence, having a psychological cost attached to the real-
ization [D,D] can only decrease the material payo¤ of the individual incurring
this cost. This concludes the only ifpart of the claim. In order to see that a
psychological cost that is associated with the realization [D,C] has the potential
to strictly increase the individuals payo¤, suppose that both the individual and
his opponent share such a psychological cost and this cost is su¢ ciently high to
make them prefer [C,C] to [D,C], and this is common knowledge. Then [C,C]
becomes an equilibrium of the game played between them, and both players
payo¤s are strictly greater than without the psychological cost.
Let t(k) denote the psychological (and rational) cost of playing D against a
mass k of individuals who play C. I now show that positive monotonicity and
concavity are su¢ cient conditions for e¢ ciency of this cost in the following
sense.
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Denition 8 A rational psychological cost t(k) is said to be ine¢ cient if 9K1; K2 2
(0; 1] such that K1 < K2, t(K1) < K1g, and t(K2)  K2g.
That is, what makes the cost ine¢ cient is that it makes the individual prefer
playing C against K2 cooperative opponents to playing D against them, yet
cooperation with all these K2 individuals is not sustainable, because, at the
same time, he prefers to cheat against a subset of them of size K1 (and he can
do so as interaction is pairwise). From this denition immediately follows the
next corollary.
Corollary 4 A rational psychological cost t(k) is e¢ cient if and only if 9K 2
[0; 1] such that 8k  K; t(k)  kg, and 8k > K; t(k) < kg.
The corollary states that once t(k) falls below the linear line kg, it should
also stay below it. This does not guarantee that t(k) is increasing and concave.
However, note that the main result of the basic model, Proposition 1, holds for
any e¢ cient psychological cost t(k).31 As positive monotonicity and concavity
seem to be plausible assumptions with behavioral foundations and they help in
keeping the model tractable, I limited the analysis in the paper to the special
case of an increasing and concave t(k).
B Appendix: Endogenizing the cost of signaling
Section 4 investigated the prospects for signaling in equilibrium when the cost
of signaling for each type was exogenously given. It showed that, in order to
enable separation between the two types, this cost should be su¢ ciently higher
for asocial types (xas
xs
 1 + g). Here I suggest a way to endogenize the cost of
signaling by correlating it to the one characteristic that distinguishes the two
types in my model, namely the existence (or lack of) a psychological cost of
cheating.
Suppose that we model social interaction in two stages. In the rst stage,
groups are endogenously formed and each group plays a public good game. In
31Proposition 1 holds exactly as it is as long as there is a unique crossing point K 2 (0; 1)
at which t(k) = kg (see the proof of that proposition). Otherwise the proposition needs to
be slightly changed.
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the second stage, everyone plays one-shot PD against everyone else in society.
If the same psychological cost of cheating that characterizes social types in the
second stage applies to the public good game of the rst stage as well, this cost
can turn the contribution to the public good into a signal of sociality. Beyond
endogenizing the cost of signaling, this setup di¤ers from the one in the text in
two additional ways. First, here I implicitly assume that the signal is visible
only within the group. Thus, by signaling, the signaler may only expect to gain
the cooperation of social types who belong to his original group. Second, since
now groups are formed before signaling takes place, he may expect to have a
proportion of 1  p social types in his group, regardless of his decision whether
to signal or not.
Formally, let c denote the material cost of contributing to the public good
(for both types). Suppose that a group of size K is formed in the rst stage
and that there exists a separating equilibrium in which all the social types in
the group, and only them, contribute to the public good in the rst stage and
then form a signaling group of their own in the second. For the contribution
to be a separating signal, it should be unprotable for asocial types to mimic.
This happens if and only if the cost c exceeds the expected benet from being
perceived by the social types in the group as a social type too (in the second
stage), i.e., if and only if c exceeds the expected return to cheating them,
K (1  p) (1 + g). As for the social types, since, compared to the asocial types,
they rip o¤ smaller material benets from cooperative partners (1 instead of
1 + g from each partner), they will contribute to the public good only if the
psychological cost of shirking from contribution is su¢ ciently high. Let this
psychological cost be similar to that of cheating in the PD game, so that it
costs t(k) to shirk from contribution in the presence of a mass k of other
contributors. Then a social type has no protable deviation from contributing
if and only if the return to cooperating in the second stage with the other social
types (who do signal), minus the cost of contribution, exceeds the payo¤ of not
contributing, i.e., if and only if (1  p)K   c  0   t((1  p)K): Combining
these two conditions and denoting the size of the emergent signaling group
by S  (1  p)K, we get that contribution to a public good as a preliminary
signaling stage can lead to type separation and the formation of signaling groups
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only if
Sg  c  S  t(S): (2)
Recall now that as long as S  K, Sg is (weakly) smaller than t(S); and so
there exist values of c that satisfy this inequality. This implies the potential
existence of equilibria in which social types screen out free-riders and form
signaling groups. Moreover, as the condition Sg  t(S) implies that K is an
upper limit on S, we get that, just as with the signaling groups of Section
4, here too the limit on cooperation among social types restricts the size of
groups.
Furthermore, signaling groups will be bounded in size both from above and
from below. Just as when the cost of signaling was exogenous, the risk of
mimicry by the asocial types limits the signaling group size (S) from above
while individual rationality limits it from below. As follows from the rst
inequality in equation (2), the upper limit is c
(1+g)
, because otherwise K >
c
(1 p)(1+g) , in which case, as explained above, asocial types nd it protable to
contribute to the public good and then cheat in the second stage. As for the
lower limit, the second inequality in equation (2) implies that S + t(S) (which
is monotonically increasing in S and equals 0 when S = 0) must be greater
than c. However, there is another sense in which the act of contribution should
be individually rational: As social types can refrain from taking part in any
group in the rst stage and thus secure a zero payo¤, individual rationality
implies also that their total payo¤ in a signaling group must be positive. This
adds a restriction on the benet created by the public good. Let k  b denote
the benet to each member of the group from the public good when a mass k
of individuals contribute. Then, individual rationality requires Sb  c+S  0,
where Sb  c is the payo¤ in the rst stage and S is the payo¤ in the second.
Thus, S is limited from below also by c
(1+b)
. The size of a signaling group must
therefore be at the range
h
c
(1+b)
; c
(1+g)
i
. This further implies that contribution
to the public good can serve as a separating signal only if b  g, i.e., only if
the public benet it creates exceeds the private benet from cheating.
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C Appendix: proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 2 The equation t(K) = Kg has a unique strictly positive solution K
in ]0; 1[. Moreover, t(K) > Kg for every K 2 0; K while t(K) < Kg for
every K 2  K; 1.
Proof. First assume by negation that there are at least two solutions to equa-
tion t(K) = Kg in the interval ]0; 1[, denoted by K1 and K2. Since the condi-
tions on lim
k!0
t0(k) and lim
k!0+
t(k) imply that for " ! 0+ we have t(") > "g, we
get that
1  K1   "
K2   "

t(") +
K1   "
K2   "t(K2) >

1  K1   "
K2   "

"g +
K1   "
K2   "K2g = K1g;
while the concavity of t () implies that
1  K1   "
K2   "

t(") +
K1   "
K2   "t(K2)  t(K1);
which contradicts the assumption that K1 solves the equation t(K) = Kg. Next,
note that t(K)   Kg is strictly positive at K = ", strictly negative at K =
1 (by assumption), and any possible discontinuity in between is an increase.
Thus t(K)   Kg = 0 at least once in the range ["; 1]. Therefore we get that
t(K) Kg = 0 exactly once in the range ["; 1] ; at which point t(K) Kg changes
signs from positive to negative, so that t(K) > Kg for every K 2 0; K while
t(K) < Kg for every K 2  K; 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote the action played by player i in the PD
game against player j by sij. Since, for both types, defection is a best response
against an opponent playing D himself, we get that in equilibrium, if sij = D
then sji = D. Hence, sinceD is a dominant strategy for asocial types, and types
are common knowledge, we get statement (1). Next, it follows from Lemma 2
that t(K) > Kg for every K < K while t(K) < Kg for every K > K. If a
mass K of individuals play C against a social type, and K  K, then his best
response is to play C against all of them, as deviating to defection against any
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subset of them (of size k  K) would impose on him a net cost of t(k) kg  0.
Otherwise, if K > K, then playing C against all of them cannot be his best
response, because deviating to playing D against all of them would increase his
total payo¤ by Kg   t(K) > 0. This completes the proof of statement (2).
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 3 Let  (k; p)  t((1  p) k) k[(1 p)g+p`]: Then for any p 2 (0; 1),
9Kp 2 (0; K) s.t.  (k; p)  0 if and only if k  Kp. Furthermore, Kp is
strictly decreasing in p.
Proof. The conditions on t(k) and on the payo¤s of the game imply that
for any given p 2 (0; 1) ; we have  (0; p) = 0 and  (k; p) < 0 for every
k > K (because t((1  p) k)  t(k), [(1   p)g + p`] > g and for every k > K
we have t(k) < kg). Moreover, lim
k!0
@(k;p)
@k
= +1 (or, if lim
k!0
t0(k) is not dened,
lim
k!0+
(k; p) = lim
k!0+
t(k) > 0) and  (k; p) is weakly concave in k: Thus, 9Kp 2
(0; K) such that  (Kp; p) = 0;  (k; p) > 0 for every k < Kp; and  (k; p) < 0
for every k > Kp.32 Finally,  (k; p) is strictly decreasing in p, which means
that for any fp; qjp < qg we have  (k; q) < 0 for every k  Kp, and so Kq <
Kp, i.e., Kp is strictly decreasing in p.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, it is straightforward that asocial types have
no protable deviation, since as members of mixed groups they already play
their dominant strategy D against everyone else in society. As for the social
types, consider a social type who is a member of a mixed group of size K. By
the denition of a mixed group, all the social types in the group play C against
all other group members, including him. Moreover, because of the incomplete
information, the individual cannot choose to defect only against the asocial
types in the group. Defecting against any subset of the group, of mass k  K,
of which only a fraction of (1  p) are social,33 would result in an increase in the
32If  (k; p) is discontinuous due to discontinuity of t(k), then the same logic of the proof
to Lemma 2 applies here too.
33Strictly speaking, the distribution of realizations (in terms of the exact proportion of
social types) over an interval of size k is not dened. However, it is common to assume that
the measure p applies to any subinterval of the original range [0; 1]. One way to explicitly
model this is to represent society by [0; 1]2, where the choice of partners is applied only in
one dimension (represented by choosing a subinterval of [0; 1]), while the other dimension
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expected material payo¤of k[(1 p)g+p`], but the expected total payo¤would
also decrease by t((1  p) k) due to the cost of cheating. Thus, the individual
would have no protable deviation if and only if t((1  p) k)  k[(1  p)g+ p`]
for every k  K, i.e., i¤ (k; p) = t((1  p) k)  k[(1  p)g + p`]  0 for every
k  K: By Lemma 3, this holds if and only if K  Kp, where Kp is the unique
value of k for which  (k; p) = 0. It thus follows that mixed groups of size K
are sustainable if and only if K  Kp. That Kp is decreasing in p is proved in
Lemma 3.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider a signaling group of size K. Then: (i) There are su¢ ciently
many social types to form the group if and only if K  1   p. (ii) Group
members are social types hence have no protable deviation to not signaling
if and only if xs  K. (iii) Group members have no protable deviation to
cheating if and only if K  K. (iv) The asocial types who are not part of
any group in equilibrium have no protable deviation to signaling and then
cheating if and only if K(1 + g)  xas  0.
C.4 Proving results on welfare and stability (Sect. 4.2)
Proof of Proposition 4. Take any coalition formation  that contains a
non-zero mass of signalers. Then q, the proportion of asocial types among the
non-signalers, is strictly greater than p, their proportion in society. Take now
a di¤erent partition 0 with no signaling, such that all the members of mixed
groups under partition  are still members of mixed groups of the same size
under 0. This partition can be sustained in equilibrium since Kq < Kp (see
Proposition 2). Moreover, under partition 0, each of these individuals gains a
strictly higher expected payo¤ than under partition . This is so because the
fraction of asocial types in the groups decreases from q under  to p under 0,
and both types gain from this decrease.
Proof of Lemma 1. First recall that the expected payo¤ of a social type in
a mixed group of size K is K[1   p(1 + `)], which is negative if p > 1
1+`
, but
positive and increasing in the group size if p  1
1+`
, where, given p, it reaches
guarantees that the proportion of asocial types is p for every chosen set of partners.
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its maximal value f (p)  Kp[1  p(1 + `)] when the group is of maximal size,
Kp. Since, for p  11+` , both Kp and [1 p(1+`)] are positive and decreasing in
p (see Proposition 2), we get that f(p) is also positive and (strictly) decreasing
in p at p 2 0; 1
1+`

. Moreover, f(0) = K > K^   xs, and f
 
1
1+`

= 0. Hence,
given that xs < K^, there is a unique solution to equation (1), denoted by pc,
and pc 2
 
0; 1
1+`

. Next, since K^   xs is the maximal equilibrium payo¤ in
signaling groups, we get that if p < pc this payo¤ is strictly smaller than the
payo¤ achievable by social types in mixed groups. If on the other hand p  pc,
then the converse is true the maximal payo¤ achievable by social types in
mixed groups is smaller than K^ xs, the maximal payo¤achievable in signaling
groups.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let  be a coalition formation with a non-zero
mass of signalers, and let q denote the proportion of asocial types among the
non-signalers under this coalition formation. Consider now a di¤erent coalition
formation 0 in which there is no signaling, and which contains a mixed group
T of size Kp. If p < pc, it follows that p < 11+` , in which case the expected
payo¤of every member of T is strictly higher than the maximal expected payo¤
he can obtain in a mixed group under partition  (because p < q ) f (p) >
max ff (q) ; 0g see Figure 4 and the proof to Lemma 1). Furthermore, since T
is of maximal size, the fact that p < pc implies (by Lemma 1) that the expected
payo¤ of social types in T is higher than the expected payo¤ of any member
of a signaling group under partition . Thus, the expected payo¤s of all the
members of T are strictly higher than their expected payo¤s under coalition
formation , and so  is unstable.
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